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Minimizing Disputes and Maximizing Profits:
Five Balancing Acts for New Business Owners
Trippe S. Fried*
I. INTRODUCTION
A business begins with an idea, one person's plan, innovation, or
concept that may, in the future, become part of a profit-making en-
deavor. Developing a going concern around that idea or concept usu-
ally involves a number of people, each of whom offers a specific, often
indispensable asset or skill. One person may bring money, another
expertise in design or marketing, and a third contacts with vendors or
customers. Successful businesses are most often built upon a combina-
tion of several individuals' resources and talents.'
Almost two-thirds of all business start-ups fail within six years.2 The
causes are myriad: The market for the product or service offered may
collapse, there may be inadequate capital for the business to produce
and distribute the product, government approval for the sale of a reg-
ulated commodity or for the payment for a regulated service may take
too long to obtain, or competition from established, similarly-situated
entities may be too fierce. Companies also frequently collapse from
disputes between the very people trying to make it profitable. 3 In
many start-ups, a few individuals serve as owners, managers, and em-
ployees and perform most of the key functions; if a dispute arises or
their interests diverge, each owner's focus shifts away from pursuing
mutually beneficial profit-making opportunities to the individual's po-
sition in the disagreement. An unresolved conflict between partners,
joint venturers, shareholders, or limited liability company members
may destroy an otherwise promising endeavor.4
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1. See Jolyn Pope, Braving the Waters: A Guide for Tennessee's Aspiring Entrepreneurs, 3
TENN. J. Bus. L. 1, 5 (2002).
2. Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing a Start-Up
Company, 56 ARK. L. REv. 773, 774 (2004).
3. See Cynthia S. Granfield, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Shareholders in Closely
Held Corporations: The Morality of Small Business, 14 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 381, 401-02
(2002).
4. See id.
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Destructive disputes are particularly prevalent in small businesses
because the stakes for the individual investor are so high. Most inves-
tors prefer to diversify their holdings to hedge against losses, but small
business owners often pour all of their assets plus borrowed funds into
their ventures.5 For the entrepreneur, business failure can mean per-
sonal financial ruin. Furthermore, owners of start-ups anticipating
losses or marginal profitability over the short term often opt not to
incur the legal and accounting fees and similar costs of fully assessing
and allocating the burden of potential risks. Since many courts are
reluctant to interfere in business relationships except in cases of ex-
treme misconduct (though ironically many entrepreneur litigants are
less sophisticated in legal matters and more in need of judicial gui-
dance than larger corporations with in house or retained lawyers)
small business owners must be particularly careful in choosing part-
ners and associates. 6
This article explores how individuals who form, promote, and run
start-up businesses can avoid destructive disputes. It identifies five
balancing acts which new business owners must perform and advo-
cates avoiding internal conflict by balancing competing interests
openly and in writing. The article concludes by suggesting that small
business attorneys familiarize their clients with these five balancing
acts at the beginning of the representation and help the entrepreneurs
to plan accordingly.
II. PROTECTING A BRIGHT IDEA: THE FIRST Two
BALANCING ATs
When a group of entrepreneurs pools its talents to start a business,
the individuals involved are at least implicitly agreeing to share both
the risks and rewards of the venture. How those risks and rewards are
to be allocated among the investors (at least for the short term) must
be determined at the beginning of the commercial relationship and
reduced to writing. This agreement must specifically set out each par-
ticipant's contribution to the project - monetary investment, labor, or
otherwise - as well as her share of future profits and losses. The pro-
cess of negotiating the terms of the agreement involves the first two
balancing acts.
5. Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation on Resources, 89 Nw. U.
L. REV. 140, 154-56 (1994).
6. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need
for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1609, 1651-52 (2004).
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First, the innovator around whose idea the venture is created must
determine that consideration for which she will part with sole owner-
ship of her business concept. An idea is the intellectual property of the
person who thought of it. 7 However, the idea by itself is probably
worth little. The concept's originator must enlist the help of others
with skills in business operation, marketing, human resources, and
similar areas to develop a profitable endeavor. Those participants
often become equity investors in the business. They are reimbursed
for their contributions directly from the business' profits. While the
innovator is entitled to fair consideration for the concept itself, to se-
cure the indispensable assistance of other members of the business
team the innovator must both accept a finite schedule of remunera-
tion and turn over some level of operational control of the business.
The innovator's compensation should be commensurate with the level
of risk involved in the venture and with the costs incurred to develop
the idea. The greater the likelihood of future profitability (and the
greater the accrued costs of development) the more money the person
who conceived of the idea should receive. The result must be a mutu-
ally beneficial, fairly balanced distribution of the risks and rewards
among all involved. 8
Attracting capital and simultaneously protecting the idea from un-
necessary disclosure is the second balancing act. The innovator must
safeguard the idea's value by preventing disclosure to or appropria-
tion by third parties. 9 Forming a business team naturally entails the
disclosure of sensitive information: the potential profitability of the
idea (what makes it attractive to qualified prospective investors) must
be conveyed to future team members who will demand adequate in-
formation in order to make the best investment decision. However,
shared information could also be used by others to establish or benefit
a directly competing endeavor. This increased potential for competi-
tion (and the prospect of a decreased market share) makes the con-
cept less valuable. As a result, the most qualified potential investors
7. Eran Kahana, Intellectual Property in an Information Economy: Protecting Intellectual
Property in Startups: A Guide for the Entrepreneurial Attorney in the New Economy, 28 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. 1187, 1188 (2002).
8. An agreement between investors that is mutually beneficial to all involved runs a much
lower risk of being breached. Janet W. Steverson, I Mean What I Say, I Think: The Danger of
Small Businesses Entering into Legally Enforceable Agreements that May Not Reflect Their
Intentions, 7 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 283, 291 (2003).
9. William L. Schaler, Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Considerations for Illinois Small
Businesses Seeking to Expand, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 845, 866 (2004).
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will closely scrutinize the extent to which the project's intellectual
property is protected. 10
A number of legal tools are available to accomplish seemingly in-
congruous ends."1 Many innovations are considered trade secrets
under state law; a trade secret is information that is economically val-
uable, protected from disclosure, and not generally known.12 Reason-
able efforts must be made to maintain its secrecy and the adequacy of
the measures employed depends on the specific concept, theory, or
idea involved. 13 Materials which contain (or are themselves consid-
ered) trade secrets should be clearly designated as confidential. The
innovator should seek legal advice or other training on disclosure-pre-
vention measures, and disclosure guidelines should be included in pro-
spectuses and other marketing materials.14 Prospective investors,
directors, members, partners, employees, and independent service
providers should be required to sign confidentiality, non-disclosure,
and/or non-competition agreements before being given access to sen-
sitive information. These documents prohibit the sharing of protected
information with third parties or using the information for pecuniary
gain outside of the proposed venture and are generally enforced by
courts. 15 In addition, only information relevant to the business propo-
sal should be provided.16
Some intellectual property is also subject to legal protection. An
invention may be patented, a creative work or computer software
copyrighted, a slogan or moniker trade or service marked. 17 The in-
novator should seek legal advice concerning the applicability and po-
tential benefits of federal and state intellectual property statutes.
10. See Eran Kahana, Intellectual Property in an Information Economy: Protecting Intellectual
Property in Startups: A Guide for the Entrepreneurial Attorney in the New Economy, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (2002).
11. For example, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 authorizes the federal government to
pursue civil remedies on behalf of victims of trade secret theft and to prosecute wrongdoers. 18
U.S.C. § 1831 (2006). However, the Act does not provide for a private right of action. Id.
12. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
13. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act adopted by state legislatures generally requires the owner
of a trade secret to take measures to prevent its disclosure to the public. See, e.g., COL.
REV.STAT. § 7-74-102 (2005); FLA. STAT. ch. 688.002 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-2 (2005).
14. Schaler, supra note 9, at 867-69.
15. Id. at 868-69.
16. See id. at 869.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §101 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1051, 1053 (2006).
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III. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESS TEAM: THE
THIRD BALANCING Acr
As with all startups, the promoters or organizers must choose the
business form that best serves their needs.1 8 This selection entails the
third balancing act: minimizing the risk of loss to the investors while
apportioning operational control of the entity.19 Individual liability is
minimized by assuming a legal identity distinct from the investors.
However, creation of a business entity decreases each individual in-
vestor's control over his or her investment.
The available business forms - the limited liability company, sub-
chapter S Corporation, sub-chapter C Corporation, closely held cor-
poration, limited liability partnership, general partnership, limited
partnership, and sole proprietorship - are well known. The limited
liability company has become the most popular form of business en-
tity because it offers both the limited liability and pass through taxa-
tion benefits of a sub-chapter S Corporation and the flexibility and
relative ease of management of a partnership. 20 An LLC is particu-
larly beneficial for start ups because its flexible structure allows the
members to cater a governance plan to the particular issues con-
fronting the enterprise and the business team.21 "[LLC] statutes typi-
cally assume that individual owners will develop their own LLC
operating agreements that define their respective rights, responsibili-
ties, and remedies. '22 This includes the right, within parameters set by
the Internal Revenue Service, to allocate the tax benefit of losses to
those who assume greater risk of loss. 23
Partnerships offer the most operational control to the individual in-
vestor.24 A partner has the right to fully participate in the manage-
ment of the business and can force the dissolution of the partnership
18. The IRS's adoption of the "check-the-box" regulations allows businesses more flexibility
in structuring their internal affairs without the risk of losing favorable tax treatment. Gary W.
Derrick, Oklahoma Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships, 22 OKLA.
CIT U. L. REV. 643, 646-47 (1997).
19. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific
Assets and Minority Oppression in Closely Held Corporations, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 913, 916
(1999).
20. See generally, THOMAS A. HUMPHREYS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES & LIMITED LIA-
BILITY PARTNERSHIPS (2004). The LLC is so popular that the S-corporation may by a dying
breed. Id. § 1.01.
21. See id. § 2.02.
22. Miller, supra note 6, at 1610-11.
23. Robert G. Lang, Utah's Limited Liability Company Act: Viable Alternative or Trap for the
Unwary?, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 941, 956-57 (1993).
24. Rock & Wachter, supra note 19, at 920.
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at will.25 However, a partner is personally liable for any business debt
whether or not he acquiesced in its accrual or even had knowledge of
its existence. 26 Limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships
(or professional LLPs) offer more protection from individual liability
to investors.27
Corporations are the most formally structured of the business forms
and can still offer the entrepreneur both pass-through taxation and
limited liability.28 The records that a corporation is required to main-
tain are particularly useful to the owners of very small entities when
they are personally sued for corporate debts. These documents can
help establish that the corporation and its shareholders are in fact dis-
tinct.2 9 Larger firms with multiple classes of stock or businesses con-
sidering an IPO in the short-term (or which already offer publicly-
traded shares) should operate as sub-chapter C Corporations subject
to taxation of both profits and dividends.30
Choosing an operational form is the first step in contracting rights
and responsibilities among members of the business team. It addresses
two key, but narrow, issues: tax liability and individual (as opposed to
entity-level) responsibility for corporate obligations. 31 The internal
operating procedures also depend to a small extent on the type of
entity selected.32 Corporations, LLCs, and partnerships are all subject
to certain default management provisions set out by state statute.
These statutes set forth more comprehensive governance require-
ments for corporations than for LLCs. For example, corporations are
required to have a tiered-management system.33 They must be gov-
erned by at least one director who may or may not be a shareholder
and must also have at least two corporate officers, a president, and a
25. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-401(f)(2005).
26. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-1-602(a)(2005).
27. STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 5:35 (2005).
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 1366 (2005).
29. Failure to observe corporate formalities may nullify the distinction between the corpora-
tion and its individual owners. Courts look to a number of factors when determining whether or
not to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold individual owners liable for company debts. See, e.g.,
Fairfield Dev., Inc. v. Georgetown Woods Senior Apts., L.P., 768 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002). Courts will pierce the veil when the corporation is used to perpetrate a fraud or injustice.
See, e.g., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ross, 521 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D. 1994); Giuffria v. Red River
Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So. 2d 793, 795 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
30. 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2004).
31. See generally, HUMPHREYS, supra note 20, §2.
32. ALBERTY, supra note 27, § 2:9.
33. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-101(a) (1986) (requiring each corporation to have a
board of directors); id. § 48-18-401(a) (requiring each corporation to have a president and a
secretary).
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secretary. 34 The directors do not have absolute authority and cannot
take certain actions absent the approval of the shareholders. 35 An
LLC, on the other hand, can be member-managed (i.e. managed by
the owners themselves, akin to a partnership) or manager-managed
(managed by managers who may or may not be members, akin to a
corporation). 36
Regardless of the form chosen, the business team must specifically
allocate the bulk of the rights and responsibilities among themselves.
This should always be done in a writing formally approved by each
member. State corporation statutes usually mandate the adoption of
written by-laws, but LLC and partnership statutes often do not.37
Nonetheless, a written partnership agreement or LLC operating
agreement is essential to preventing potentially destructive disputes
among members of the business team and protecting the members'
investments.38 For one, if the owners of a partnership or LLC fail to
adopt a set of governance guidelines, the state code will impute those
guidelines for them. For example, if the organizers of an LLC fail to
designate whether or not the entity is member-managed or manager-
managed, most state statutes will automatically designate the LLC as
member-managed. 39 Likewise, in a partnership, all of the partners are
presumed to be entitled to an equal share of any profits unless the
partnership agreement provides otherwise. 40 Second, a well-drafted
agreement is a "road map" to which the business team members can
refer if questions concerning rights or obligations arise.41 It also helps
34. Id. § 48-18-401(a).
35. See, e.g., id. § 48-22-102(b) (setting out the procedure for corporate approval of transfers
outside of the ordinary course of business).
36. HUMPHREYS, supra note 20, § 4.02. Despite its recent popularity, an LLC is not always
the optimal business form. For example, a limited partnership may be the best means of combin-
ing managerial talent and passive investment. An LP allows investors with no management re-
sponsibilities to make capital contributions to and receive monetary reimbursement from a
partnership without assuming personal liability for the entity's debts.
37. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-206-101(a) (1994) (stating that Tennessee requires an
operating agreement for board-managed LLCs, but not for member-managed LLCs).
38. An enforceable written agreement also protects the remaining owners in the event that
one of them seeks to withdraw from the endeavor. An investor may question the profitability of
the enterprise because of a market shift or some other anticipated event or simply decide to
pursue other opportunities. The agreement can provide for penalties or other disincentives to
keep the enterprise from losing vital sources of capital. Steverson, supra note 8, at 297-98.
39. STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 7:26 (2003).
40. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-401(b) (2002). Tennessee has adopted the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act. Id. §§ 61-1-101 to -1208.
41. "[Private agreements] are necessary to enable [the small business] to plan for and dis-
tribute needed money, goods, and/or services as efficiently as possible." Steverson, supra note 8,
at 288. This is true both for agreements between the owners of a small business and for those
between the business and third parties.
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lawyers, accountants, and other professional consultants to advise the
business if there is a dispute.42
This writing must reflect a consensus in three major areas: (1) con-
tribution requirements, (2) management rights, and (3) rights to distri-
bution. Contractual provisions concerning contribution and
distribution codify the financial arrangements agreed to by the inves-
tors. Management rights, including the rights of individual owners to
make key decisions, policies, and procedures for day-to-day opera-
tions, a system for resolving disagreements among the owners, and
causes and procedures for dissolution should also be part of the writ-
ten agreement.43 Important issues particular to the business must be
addressed in the operational agreement. For example, the contract
should assign ownership of and use rights to intellectual property ex-
clusively to the business and restrict dissemination of proprietary in-
formation by individual owners during and after their involvement
with the enterprise. The agreement should set out in plain and unam-
biguous language the circumstances under which the entity can oper-
ate outside of the usual course of business. For example, under what
circumstances can the businesses be merged with another entity or
liquidate its assets?
In sum, adopting a well-written agreement setting out the rights and
responsibilities of each member is as important as selecting the right
business form. Even though partnership agreements and LLC operat-
ing agreements are not always required by statute, a contract is the
optimal means of ensuring a balance between the rights and responsi-
bilities of each member.
IV. SELF-INTEREST VS. ENTITY-INTEREST: THE FOURTH
BALANCING ACT
The profitability of a small business is in large part a function of the
owners' and investors' personal contributions of money, time, and ef-
fort. The business team works for the benefit of both the entity and
individual and the individual's return will be determined by the suc-
cess of the entity. The owners must be willing to share operational
control of the business and must have confidence that their teammates
are fulfilling their obligations and not self-dealing at the business'
42. These documents should be drafted by an attorney even if the investors are relatively
sophisticated. Id. at 308-09.
43. Sample by-laws, partnership agreements, and operating agreements are available in
STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESS (2005). Sample operating agreements for
LLCs and partnership agreements for LLPs are available in THOMAS A. HUMPHREYS, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES & LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS (2004).
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(and each other's) expense. The fourth balancing act entails person-
ally profiting from the business relationship while acting in the entity's
best interests.
Some legal mechanisms are in place that establish a basic code of
conduct. The owners of a business must deal with each other fairly.44
Directors and officers of a corporation have a statutory obligation to
act in good-faith and in the corporation's best interests. 45 Partners
owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the partnership and to each other.46
Managers and members in an LLC likewise have a fiduciary duty to
act in good-faith and in the best interests of the business.47
A fiduciary duty is defined as a duty of undivided loyalty that is
greater than the obligation of fairness implied in an arms-length trans-
action.48 It requires the obligated party to promote a collective, long-
term interest and not personal, short-term interests.49 In general, part-
ners, officers, directors, and employees have a fiduciary duty to the
businesses with which they are affiliated. They owe a duty of loyalty to
the entity itself and cannot compete directly with it, usurp its commer-
cial opportunities, or use commercial assets for personal profit.50 Each
must account to the others and hold in trust for the benefit of the
entity any personal profits derived without the entity's consent, any
profits connected with a transaction concerning the formation, busi-
ness, or liquidation of the entity, and any profits from use of entity
property.51
The existence and extent of any fiduciary duty between the owners
of a closely held entity depend on the entity's business form and the
applicable law. Courts will scrutinize the questionable conduct of part-
ners. 52 Jurisdictions differ on the extent to which fiduciary duties exist
between officers, directors, and shareholders in closely-held corpora-
44. Miller, supra note 6, at 1654.
45. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2005); id. § 48-18-403.
46. See, e.g., id. § 61-1-404.
47. See, e.g., id..§ 48-239-116 (1995) (regarding board managed entities); id. § 48-240-
102(1995) (regarding member managed entities).
48. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
49. See Terry A. O'Neill, Toward a New Theory of the Closely-Held Firm, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 603, 611-12 (1993).
50. UNIF. P'sHIw Acr § 21 (1914); UNIF. LTD. P'sHiP ACT § 403(a) (1985). See UNIF. LTD.
LIAB. Co. ACT § 410(b)(2) (1996). See, generally, Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Avail-
able to the Dissatisfied Participant in a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 465, 486-
87.
51. UNIF. P'SHiP Acr § 21 (1914). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act limits the fiduciary
duties to account for profits or benefits, to refrain from dealing on behalf of a party with inter-
ests adverse to the partnership, and to refrain from competing with the partnership prior to its
dissolution. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (1997).
52. See Miller, supra note 6, at 1641-42.
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tions. 53 The "majority view" holds that owners of a closely-held cor-
poration are fiduciaries akin to partners.54 The "minority view" only
recognizes a heightened duty of officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders to the corporation itself.55 Furthermore, in some states,
including Delaware and Maryland, entities can specifically opt to be
governed by a distinct close corporation statute.56
While courts and commentators have recognized the need for some
form of legal protection for business owners and investors from un-
scrupulous team members, as a practical matter, alternatively ambigu-
ous and technical agency principals do little to prevent disputes and
less to deter self-dealing. 57 Neither the Uniform Partnership Act of
1914 nor the Revised Uniform Partnership Act adopted by a number
of jurisdictions in the 1990s expressly states whether partners can
waive fiduciary obligations. 58 The courts are split on whether or not
the fiduciary duties incorporated into the statutes should be discre-
tionary.59 The specific conduct prohibited or demanded of the obli-
gated party in a particular situation is often unclear or subject to
multiple interpretations. 60 Enforcing compliance with fiduciary obliga-
tions requires protracted, expensive proceedings, and as a practical
matter litigation only deters the most egregious conduct.61 The only
certainty attendant to such lawsuits is the demise of the relationship
between its parties. The result is a disincentive to demand that team
53. Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L 377, 377-
78 (2004).
54. The seminal "majority view" case is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975). The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that because close corporations resemble
partnerships the same fiduciary duty is owed by the owners to each other and to the entity. Id. at
512. Moreover, this duty is greater than that of a director or stockholder to a closely held corpo-
ration. Id. The court revised its focus to whether or not acts damaging to minority shareholders
have no legitimate business purpose. Wilkes v. Springdale Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,
663 (Mass. 1976). Courts applying Massachusetts law have also held minority shareholders liable
for breach of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., AW. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 25 (1st
Cir. 1997).
55. Delaware, a popular state of incorporation, adheres to the minority view.
56. MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4-201 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2005);
See generally David M. Deaton, Check-the-Box: An Opportunity for States to Take Another Look
at Business Formation, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
57. O'Neill, supra note 50, at 603-05.
58. See, e.g., Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 265 (2004).
59. Id.
60. Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine,
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 53-4 (2000).
61. Id. at 59-60.
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members comply with fiduciary obligations and an incentive to breach
them.62
The statutory remedies available to oppressed corporate sharehold-
ers are equally ineffective in promoting fair dealing and efficient dis-
pute resolution. Corporate acts remain focused on addressing the
needs of larger, publicly traded entities and not on entrepreneurial
endeavors or closely-held start up businesses. 63 They have been
amended to accommodate the proliferation of closely-held entities
primarily by offering the shareholders opportunities to contract out of
the minority shareholder trap using the bylaws or separate agree-
ments. 64 The statutes have also broadened the authority of courts to
involuntarily dissolve corporations for oppressive conduct by a major-
ity shareholder. However, there is no uniform standard used to define
"oppressive:" abusive conduct, repeated violations of fiduciary duties,
and inconsistency with the minority shareholders' reasonable expecta-
tions have been used in different jurisdictions to justify an involuntary
corporate dissolution.65
To improve the likelihood of a startup's success, the prohibition
against self-dealing codified by the common law of fiduciary duties
should be incorporated into an entity's governing documents and into
any separate contracts with officers, directors, partners, and employ-
ees.66 For example, to attract sophisticated minority investors, closely-
held businesses owners must provide protection from the minority
shareholder trap. Under a traditional corporate governance system,
minority owners are restricted in their ability to influence corporate
decisions (and to protect their investments). 67 In a publicly held en-
tity, a minority shareholder who disagrees with the majority has the
option of selling his stock to a third-party purchaser. However, there
is no market for the shares of a closely-held corporation.68 A minority
shareholder unable to influence the company's decision-makers or to
recoup his initial investment is at best relegated to the position of a
limited partner with no governance rights. At worst, majority share-
62. Id.
63. James M. Van Viet & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Share-
holders Caught in a Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 263-64 (1998).
64. Siegel, supra note 54, at 384-85.
65. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen's Diversified, 153 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1998); Colt v. Mt.
Princeton Trout Club, 78 P.3d 1115, 1118-19 (Col. Ct. App. 2003); Royals v. Piedmont Electric
Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 518-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 126-
28 (N.J.Super. 1996).
66. Schaler, supra note 9, at 938-39.
67. Cumulative voting is another means of assuring minority shareholder participation in cor-
porate decision-making.
68. Van Vliet & Snider, supra note 64, at 242.
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holders exploit this disadvantage by forcing minority owners to sell
their shares for a reduced value or at a loss. The law of fiduciary du-
ties has provided a legal framework for granting relief to minority
shareholders caught in this trap, but protections for such investors
must be specifically adopted to maximize their effectiveness.
V. PROFIT TAKING WITHOUT UNDERCAPITALIZING THE BUSINESS:
THE FIFrH BALANCING ACT
Small business owners should profit from their efforts. Entrepre-
neurs who do not see a reasonable return for the money, time, and
work that they invest will have little incentive to continue in busi-
ness.69 However, profits must be taken without jeopardizing the enter-
prise's ability to continue to grow and make money. The fifth
balancing act entails paying investors enough to encourage continued
participation in the endeavor while retaining sufficient operating capi-
tal for the business to prosper and grow.
One of the biggest problems for small businesses is inadequate or
inconsistent cash flow. An entity profitable by accounting standards
may lack the liquidity to pay for materials, wages, taxes, and other
necessary expenses. 70 Even when the business' balance sheet shows
excess cash, prudent planning demands that the entity maintain ade-
quate reserves to handle future hardships. The entity must be able to
weather unexpected increases in vendor costs, costs of growth includ-
ing increased labor or fixed capital demands, natural disasters, tax in-
creases, increased regulatory expenses, or economic downturns.
Accordingly, small business owners must carefully consider the en-
tity's long-term viability when determining what to distribute to inves-
tors and what to reinvest in the company.
Exacerbating the cash flow problems experienced by many small
businesses is the reluctance of many banks, venture capitalists, and
other investors without direct ties to the entity to loan it money.71
Assessing the risk of investing in a start-up is difficult; the viability of
the business plan is unproven, potential lenders may be unfamiliar
69. Small businesses meeting certain criteria can issue stock offering tax incentives to attract
investment. The Internal Revenue Code precludes taxation on certain investments in qualified
small business stock. 26 U.S.C. § 1045 (2006); id. § 1202. See generally David 0. Kahn, Tax Tips:
A Qualified Small Business Stock Tax Primer, 23 L.A. LAW. 17 (2000).
70. Cash flow inconsistencies are even taken into account in determining the amount of com-
pensation due to a small business owner who suffers a personal injury. Gene A. Trevino, A Note
on Formulating and Corroborating Discount Rates for Small Firms, 7 J. LEGAL ECON. 45, 45-46
(1997).
71. The Small Business Administration is a source of public funding for qualified small
businesses.
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with the entrepreneurs' skills in operating and managing a business,
and there may be insufficient collateral to secure repayment. 72 The
increased risk of loss means that entrepreneurs who can obtain financ-
ing will pay higher interest rates. Furthermore, banks and other lend-
ers will want to closely and continuously monitor the credit-
worthiness of the enterprise. 73 Additional monitoring costs decrease
the return on investment and are a disincentive to small business
loans. At the very least, the increased cost to the lender will be passed
on to the entrepreneurs. Accordingly, small businesses must establish
their own reserves both to lower the perceived risk to financial institu-
tions of lending it money and to insure sufficient liquidity in the event
that borrowing money is not an option.
The undercapitalization of the business can have additional conse-
quences for the owners. Inadequate capital is a key indicator of both a
lack of creditworthiness and of an increased risk of loss for lenders.74
Undercapitalization may also result in a court "piercing the corporate
veil" and holding individual owners liable for corporate obligation.75
Inadequate capital is a key consideration of most courts in determin-
ing whether or not the corporate form has been adhered to by the
shareholders. 76
VI. CONCLUSION
The five balancing acts set forth in this article take place as part of
the day to day operation of small businesses all over the country. En-
trepreneurs who are unfamiliar with legal or accounting principals
cannot rely on trial and error to decide the best means of protecting
intellectual property, dividing management responsibilities, allocating
risks, and sharing rewards. The margin for error is too slim and the
risk of failure too great.
Corporate counsel must identify these five balancing acts for their
clients and help them to set and reach attainable goals for business
performance. Entrepreneurs must be aware of the consequences of
imbalance. For example, the attorney must advise the client on how
to maintain the confidentiality of information and still be able to use it
to attract investment. She must help entrepreneurs craft contracts
72. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small Firm Financing Problem: Private Information and Public
Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 177, 180-81 (1998).
73. Id. at 180.
74. See Booth, supra note 5, at 161-62.
75. See id. at 162.
76. See Nat'l Hotel Assocs. v. 0. Ahlborg & Sons, Inc., 827 A.2d 646 (R.I. 2003); see also
Rotella v. Derner, 283 A.2d 1026 (N.Y. App. 2001).
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that allocate risks and rewards among investors in a way that creates
and incentive for continued participation in the enterprise and allows
it to retain sufficient liquidity for "rainy days." By working with entre-
preneurs to achieve balance on the issues set forth above, corporate
counsel decreases the risks of the destructive internal conflicts which
so often doom start-ups to failure.
